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Patient dumping, outlier payments, and




We analyze a rationale for official authorization of patient dumping in the prospective payment policy framework. We
show that when the insurer designs the healthcare payment policy to let hospitals dump high-cost patients, there is a
trade-off between the disutility of dumped patients (changes in hospitals’ rent extraction due to low-severity patients)
and the shift in the level of cost reduction efforts for high-severity patients. We also clarify the welfare-improving
conditions by allowing hospitals to dump high-severity patients. Finally, we show that if the efficiency of the cost
reduction efforts varies extensively and the healthcare payment cost is substantial, or if there are many private
hospitals, the patient dumping policy can improve social welfare in a wider environment.
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Background
Government agencies in many countries would like to
introduce social security systems that decrease health-
care payments while providing high-quality medical ser-
vices. Two types of healthcare reimbursement policies
achieve this end: the retrospective payment system and
the prospective payment system.1 The retrospective pay-
ment system is a cost-based system in which insurers pay
the entire treatment cost to hospitals. Under the prospec-
tive payment system, insurers pay a fixed amount defined
by a government agency for each diagnosis per admission.
The latter system incentivizes hospitals to reduce treat-
ment costs and may yield socially optimal cost reductions
by hospitals.2 Accordingly, some countries have intro-
duced prospective payments to reduce the cost of social
security.3
Under the prospective payment system, however, hos-
pitals incur risk when treating extraordinarily expensive
patients (also called outlier patients). Hospitals that admit
outlier patients incur losses even if they make socially
optimal efforts to reduce treatment costs. Subsequently,
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an incentive naturally arises for hospitals to refuse treat-
ment to avoid this financial risk, a phenomenon called
the dumping problem in the literature.4 The social cost
of patient dumping is obvious. For one thing, it trig-
gers potentially fatal treatment delays. Further, as pointed
out by Newhouse [25], the dumping problem stimulates
patient convergence on particular hospitals, particularly
public hospitals, leading to crowding and longer treatment
delays.
Given these social costs associated with the possibility
of patient dumping, a clear alternative is to insure hospi-
tals for some fraction of the extra costs incurred to treat
each outlier patient.5 We call this the outlier payment
policy for expositional clarity. This policy is precisely
what the United States adopted in the 1990s to allevi-
ate the dumping problem. Under this policy, the insurer
pays an additional amount equaling some part of the cost
exceeding the fixed payment when hospitals admit outlier
patients. This additional payment can reduce hospitals’
financial risk, thereby contributing to reduced numbers of
dumped patients.
The overall welfare effect of the outlier payment pol-
icy is not necessarily clear, however, as gains might arise
from allowing hospitals to dump patients at their discre-
tion. We argue that adopting the outlier payment policy is
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not always justified, even though hospitals are less likely
to dump outlier patients when they are insured against
such patients. To substantiate this argument, we consider
a canonical model of adverse selection in which there
are two hospitals, called private and public for exposi-
tional clarity. The sole difference between the two is that
the insurer may induce the private hospital to dump its
patients whereas it cannot allow the public hospital to do
so, perhaps because of legal restrictions. We assume that
patients randomly visit one of the hospitals that privately
observes the treatment cost for each patient.6 In this set-
ting, the insurer devises a contract for healthcare payment
that is based on the hospital’s level of effort. Given the
contract, the hospital decides which patients are to be
dumped and decides its level of cost reduction efforts
accordingly.
To observe the potential welfare consequences of
patient dumping, suppose that the insurer chooses not to
adopt the outlier payment policy and instead allows the
private hospital to dump high-severity patients selectively.
Under this patient dumping policy, it is too expensive for
the private hospital to treat high-severity patients; con-
sequently, the bulk of them is eventually transferred to
the public hospital. Although patient dumping is in itself
welfare-reducing, it also endogenously changes the distri-
bution of patients across hospitals and initiates a sorting
effect that substantially alleviates information asymmetry
regarding patient types. This sorting effect is potentially
welfare-improving because it is instrumental in reducing
information rent and consequently in realizing more effi-
cient levels of cost reduction for high-severity patients in
equilibrium. We show that gains from the sorting effect
can outweigh the social cost of patient dumping under
some conditions, suggesting that there are situations in
which some degree of patient dumping should be toler-
ated for the betterment of society.
This study yields several findings. First, if the differ-
ence in cost reduction efficiency between high- and low-
severity patients is large, the patient dumping policy is
optimal in a wider environment, even with a high ratio
of high-severity patients. Intuitively, under this circum-
stance, information rent is large, thus making patient
dumping an advantageous payment policy. Second, if
healthcare payment cost (administrative cost of a health-
care payment system) is large, the outlier payment policy
is preferred over patient dumping, 7 because an increase
in healthcare payment cost reduces information rent,
and therefore, favors outlier payment policy over patient
dumping policy. Third, if the number of patients in dump-
ing hospitals (e.g., private hospitals) is large, the patient
dumping policy improves welfare to a greater extent.
This is because government agencies adopt the patient
dumping policy and they need not pay information rent
to hospitals that dump high-severity patients, whereas
government agencies pay information rent to all hospitals
under the outlier payment policy. As such, we insist that
insurers consider the circularity of private hospitals when
choosing between outlier payment and patient dumping
policies.8
The main contribution of this study is showing that
patient dumping can be an optimal healthcare payment
policy. Numerous studies analyze patient dumping (e.g.,
Newhouse [25]; Dranove [7]; Eze and Wolfe [14]; New-
house [26]; Meltzer et al. [23]; Canta [4]. Newhouse [25]
shows that patient dumpingmay occur under the prospec-
tive payment system and under competition between
hospitals. Dranove [7] notes that the patient dumping
policy can be efficient due to specialization among hos-
pitals and concentration of patients. Eze and Wolfe [14]
also show the optimality of the patient dumping policy
using the example of the United States Veterans Affairs
hospital inpatient services. Results of these studies paral-
lel ours. However, efficiencies from patient dumping are
“gains from specialization”? in both studies, whereas, in
the present study, efficiencies from patient dumping are
“gains from information acquisition”.
Canta [4] also shows the optimality of the patient dump-
ing policy in a similar environment, considering two types
of hospitals. However, our work differs from that of Canta
[4] in two points of environment and results. First, Canta
[4] does not explicitly analyze the healthcare payment
for a public hospital and assumes that a public hospital
does not exert a cost reduction effort. In our model, we
assume that a public hospital also exerts a cost reduction
effort, much like a private hospital, and analyze the effect
of the healthcare payment policy on the optimal con-
tract. Through the analysis, we find that the cost reduction
effort for high-severity patients and information rent for
low-severity patients is greater under the patient dump-
ing policy than under the outlier payment policy. The
former effect makes the patient dumping policy advanta-
geous since the distortion is reduced. However, the latter
effect makes it disadvantageous since the healthcare pay-
ment is increased. Second, Canta [4] assumes that all
patients go to the private hospital that can dump high-
severity patients and that the public hospital treats only
dumped patients. We assume that not all patients go to
the private hospital owing to consumer preference or geo-
graphical proximity and that a public hospital treats both
types of patients. In concrete terms, we assume that a frac-
tion of the patients goes to the private hospital and the
remaining go to the public hospital. Although the frac-
tion of patients is given exogenously, in Appendix A. we
endogenize the patients’ hospital choice. Our assumption
is valid in certain countries where patients can choose
hospitals freely. As shown in the analysis, the fraction
affects the optimal contract under the patient dumping
policy.
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We assume that insurers offer severity-dependent con-
tracts to hospitals as a healthcare payment policy, and the
severity-dependent contract can be interpreted as outlier
payment.9 Allen and Gertler [1] discusses the optimality
of this selective payment policy.10 We assume that hospi-
tals treat patients selectively. This assumption is consis-
tent with the theoretical conclusion of Ellis [10].11 Keeler
et al. [20] shows that outlier payment acts as insurance
for hospitals.12 Previous studies also investigate the opti-
mal scheme under outlier payment (Ma [21]; Ellis and
McGuire [12]; Jack [18]; Jack [19]; Mougeot and Naegelen
[24]. Ellis and McGuire [12] analyzes a consumer-welfare-
maximizing outlier payment scheme. Other works study
the optimal ratio of outlier payments. Ma [21] investigates
optimal outlier payments under the assumption of two-
dimensional efforts (cost reduction and treatment quality)
by hospitals. He reveals that insurers should reimburse all
treatment costs. Moreover, Mougeot and Naegelen [24]
studies optimal outlier payment under asymmetric infor-
mation between insurers and hospitals, and concludes




We consider a healthcare payment system in which a
public insurer offers contracts to a private and a public
hospital for treatment of patients with a specific diagno-
sis. Throughout the analysis, we denote each hospital by
j, where j = pr indicates the private hospital and j = pu,
the public hospital. As stated, the only difference between
them is that the insurer may induce the private hospi-
tal to dump patients selectively, whereas it cannot allow
the public hospital to do so. The reasoning underlying
this assumption is that if a public hospital dumps a spe-
cific type of patient, he is unlikely to receive any medical
attention; in fact, public hospitals in the United States can-
not dump any patient. Apart from this distinction, the
two hospitals are assumed to have identical technological
acumen.
To simplify, we assume that decision making by patients
is given exogenously: λ ∈ (0, 1) people select the private
hospital, and (1 − λ) people select the public hospital.13
After a patient chooses a hospital, the chosen hospital pri-
vately observes patient severity i ∈ {H , L}, where i = H
denotes a high-severity and i = L, a low-severity patient.
The insurer knows that any given patient is of the high-
severity type with probability φ ∈ (0, 1), which is common
knowledge.
Hospitals
Each hospital can reduce its treatment cost by exerting
effort.14 The marginal productivity of any cost-reducing
effort depends on patient severity, and we assume that
cost reduction is higher for low-severity than high-
severity patients for the same level of cost reduction
efforts. Cost reduction efforts potentially have adverse
consequences for hospitals, such as extended duty hours.
For a hospital with patient severity i, total cost C(i, e) can
be written as
C(i, e) = c − θie + 12e
2, i ∈ {L,H}. (1)
Here, the cost of treatment, c, is the same for any
patient type and is assumed to be sufficiently large. We
also assume θL > θH > 0, which means that it is eas-
ier to reduce the treatment cost for low-severity patients.
The last term represents the hospital’s disutility from cost
reduction efforts. Letting w denote the payment collected
from the insurer, the payoff function of a hospital with a
type-i patient can be written as15
π˜(i,w, e) = w − c + θie − 12e
2, i ∈ {L,H}. (2)
Insurer
The insurer offers each hospital a take-it-or-leave-it con-
tract to each hospital that specifies a healthcare payment
and a level of cost reduction effort for each patient sever-
ity as reported by the hospital. The contract specifies the
payment wjiˆ and the level of cost reduction efforts e
j
iˆ for a





j ≡ (ωjH ,ωjL).
The insurer seeks to maximize social welfare, assumed
to consist of (i) patients’ utility, (ii) the social cost of treat-
ment, and (iii) payment by the insurer. To achieve this,
the insurer devises a contract contingent on the hospi-
tal’s report iˆ about patient severity. Given the pair of menu
contracts (ωpr ,ωpu), assuming truth-telling, the insurer’s
payoff is given by








} + (1 − φ) [1 − C (L, eprL
) − ηwprL
]}
+(1−λ) {φ [1−C (H , epuH
)−ηwpuH





where d is an indicator function that takes d = 1 when
the private hospital dumps high-severity patients and d =
0 otherwise. We normalize patients’ utility when they
receive immediate medical treatment to 1.16 In contrast,
the utility of dumped patients is given by γ ∈ (−∞, 1),
which captures the ill-effects of patient dumping, such as
delayed attention and additional treatment cost.17 Finally,
η ∈[ 1,∞) represents a healthcare payment cost.
Timing
The timing of the game is summarized as follows:
1. the insurer offers contracts to hospitals;
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2. a fraction λ of patients select the private hospital, and
the remaining fraction 1 − λ of patients select the
public hospital, with no patient being aware of
his/her severity;
3. the hospitals observe the severity of the patients;
4. they decide whether or not to dump the patients, and
if yes, which patients to dump;
5. they set the level of cost reduction efforts;
6. they report patients’ severity to and charge
healthcare payments from the insurer, and the
contract is implemented.
Results
Optimal healthcare payment under symmetric information
This section characterizes the first-best healthcare pay-
ment system as a benchmark. With symmetric informa-
tion, we suppose that the insurer can observe patient
severity and thereby can impose its preferred cost reduc-
tion efforts on the hospital without information rent. It
is easily seen that the insurer prefers no patient dump-
ing, and the first-best contract must satisfy the following
participation constraint for each i = L,H and each j =
pr, pu:





2 ≥ 0. (PCji)
For each i = L,H and each j = pr, pu, the insurer’s
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. All constraints obviously are binding
at the optimal solution. Further, there is no reason to
treat patients differently as the hospitals are symmetric.
This implies that by substituting the participation con-
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Solving this optimization problem, we now obtain the
first-best allocation. As we assume no disparity in tech-
nology, the solution is symmetric between hospitals.
Proposition 1 In the absence of asymmetric informa-
tion between the insurer and hospitals, the optimal cost
reduction efforts and the optimal cost reduction efforts (the





























Optimal healthcare payment under asymmetric
information
Optimal outlier payment policy
In this subsection, we obtain the optimal healthcare pay-
ment under outlier payments, or simply the optimal out-
lier payment policy, under asymmetric information. For-
mally, any outlier payment policy requires the insurer
to devise a contract that satisfies all participation con-
straints. Furthermore, since the insurer cannot observe
patient severity, the optimal contract must satisfy the fol-
lowing incentive compatibility constraint for each i = L,H
and each j = pr, pu:













, i = i˜. ICji
Because the insurer designs the payment system to bar
patient dumping, d = 0 in (3), and the insurer’s problem



















































, for each i = L,H and each
j = pr, pu. The following lemma, which is well known
in the literature,18 is helpful in solving this optimization
problem.





and (ICpuL ) are binding.
This lemma implies that the following equations must
be satisfied:









L + ejH	θ , (12)
for j = pr, pu, where	θ ≡ θL−θH > 0. Note, also, that the
problem faced by one hospital is again independent from
and identical to that faced by the other hospital because
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there is no technology gap in treatment. The optimization
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Using the above, we obtain the optimal cost reduction
effort under the outlier payment policy:
epr,O∗H = epu,O∗H = θH −
η
1 + ηP	θ , (14)
epr,O∗L = epu,O∗L = θL, (15)
where P ≡ 1−φ
φ
. Here, we assume θH − η1+ηP	θ > 0 to
assure the existence of an interior solution.
Next, we obtain the optimal healthcare payment using
(11), (12), (14), and (15). It is straightforward to show that






















Comparing (6) and (14), we observe that the level of cost
reduction efforts for high-severity patients under the out-
lier payment policy is distorted downward. Since the level
of cost reduction efforts under the outlier payment pol-
icy is smaller than the first-best level, the total treatment
cost and the optimal healthcare payment for high-severity
patients are larger (the third term in (16)). In contrast,
the optimal cost reduction efforts for low-severity patients
under the outlier payment policy is not distorted, and
the insurer needs to set a higher healthcare payment (the
third term in (17)). This, too, is an effect of information
asymmetry. We summarize the optimal contract under
the outlier payment policy as follows.
Proposition 2 When the insurer constructs the health-
care payment system so as not to dump any patient, the
optimal healthcare payment compared to the first-best
case is such that




















We denote the optimized social welfare in the case of
the outlier payment policy asWO∗ .
Optimal patient dumping policy
We now examine the optimal payment policy when the
private hospital is induced to dump high-severity patients.
In this case, the insurer sets the healthcare payment for
the private hospital with a participation constraint with
respect to low-severity patients only. The insurer then
obviously offers the first-best contract for low-severity
patients. The profit of the private hospital when it admits
high-severity patients is given by




L = θL(θH−θL) < 0.
(18)
Hence, the private hospital would refuse to treat high-
severity patients, which can be observed by the insurer.









γ −C (H , epuH
) − ηwpuH
] + (1 − φ) [1 − C (L, eprL
) − ηwprL
]}
+(1−λ) {φ [1−C (H , epuH
)− ηwpuH





subject to (PCprL ), (IC
pu
i ), and (PC
pu
i ), for each i = L,H
and each j = pr, pu. Note that the public hospital still is
barred from patient dumping, and thus, the participation
constraint for high-severity patients must be satisfied for
the public hospital.
To solve this problem, we reapply Lemma 1 and obtain














L + epuH 	θ . (22)
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λγ + (1 − λ) − (1 + η)
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This problem yields the optimal cost reduction efforts
under a patient dumping policy:
epr,D∗L = θL, (24)
epu,D∗H = θH − (1 − λ)
η
1 + ηP	θ , (25)
epu,D∗L = θL. (26)
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Further, the optimal healthcare payment can be
obtained by substituting (24), (25), and (26) into (20), (21),
and (22):









θH − (1 − λ) η1 + ηP	θ
]
[









θH−(1−λ) η1 + ηP	θ
]
	θ . (29)
Unlike previous cases, the optimal contract in this case
is asymmetric between hospitals even though we assume
no asymmetry in technology. The key is that the insurer
need not provide information rent to the private hospi-
tal but still pays it to the public hospital. Comparing (17)
and (29), we observe that information rent for the public
hospital is higher under the patient dumping policy than
under the outlier payment policy. In contrast, comparing
(14) and (25), we also show that distortion in the level of
cost reduction efforts for high-severity patients is smaller
under the patient dumping policy than under the outlier
payment policy. The optimal healthcare payment system
in the case of the patient dumping policy is summarized
by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The optimal healthcare payment policy
under the patient dumping policy is such that

























We denote the optimized social welfare in the case of
the patient dumping policy asWD∗ .
Welfare analysis
Welfare comparison
We thus far have characterized optimal contracts under
two distinct regimes: outlier payment and patient dump-
ing. Given the indicated results, we now are ready to
compare social welfare between the two policies to illus-
trate whether a degree of patient dumping should be
tolerated and, if so, under what conditions. To this end,
we first compute the welfare difference between the two
policies (hereafter, welfare difference) as follows:








−φλ(1 − γ )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Patient dumping cost
+λ(1 − φ)η(θH − η1 + ηP	θ)	θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Low-severity patients in the private hospital
−(1 − λ)(1 − φ)ηλ η1 + ηP	θ
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Low-severity patients in the public hospital
. (30)
Obviously, the patient dumping policy is preferred over
the outlier payment policy when this difference is strictly
positive. The first term gives the welfare difference asso-
ciated with the treatment cost and the payment cost when
i = H (which for expositional simplicity we call the wel-
fare difference for high-severity patients). As mentioned,
the optimal level of cost reduction efforts for high-severity
patients is higher under the patient dumping policy, which
always contributes to welfare improvement. The second
term gives the welfare difference associated with patients’
utility when i = H and j = pr (the welfare difference
for high-severity patients in the private hospital). It is
always negative because the utility of dumped patients is
discounted to γ . The third term gives the welfare differ-
ence when i = L and j = pr (the welfare difference for
low-severity patients in the private hospital). It is always
positive because the insurer need not pay information rent
to the private hospital under the patient dumping policy.
Finally, the last term reflects the welfare difference when
i = L and j = pu (the welfare difference for low-severity
patients in the public hospital). It is negative because the
insurer must provide a larger information rent in this
contingency under the patient dumping policy.
The patient dumping policy clearly is less likely to be
optimal when its cost is relatively large (γ is small).We can
subsequently conjecture that there is a threshold level γ¯
such that the outlier payment policy is optimal if and only
if γ¯ > γ . By rearranging (30), the threshold is computed
as
γ¯ = 1 − 12
η2




− ηP(θH − η
(1 + η)P	θ)	θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Low-severity patients in the private hospital





Low-severity patients in the public hospital
= 1 − ηP	θ
(
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Since θH − η1+ηP	θ > 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1) by assumption,
θH − η1+ηP	θ(1 − 12λ) > 0. We also assume η and 	θ
are positive, and by definition P is positive. This implies
that γ¯ < 1. We then obtain the following result, which
is not surprising by itself but still clarifies that the patient
dumping policy can be optimal under some conditions.19
Proposition 4 There is a threshold patient dumping cost
γ¯ that satisfies γ¯ ∈ (−∞, 1).
The optimal cost reduction efforts and the information
rent analysis
We now assess the impact of changes in external condi-
tions on the optimal healthcare payment system via the
optimal level of cost reduction efforts and the change in
information rent. We particularly focus on changes in the
ratios of low-/high-severity patients and public/private
hospital patients.
Higher ratio of high-severity patients
We begin with the effect of the ratio of low-/high-severity
patients, as captured by P, and examine how a change in P
affects the threshold γ¯ . A change in P generally has three
effects on differences in social welfare. The first effect is
the number effect, that is the effect on the number of
patients for which the insurer pays information rent to
the hospital. If the number of high-severity patients rises,
the number of patients for whom the insurer pays infor-
mation rent to the hospital declines. The second effect is
the distortion effect, which is shown in (14) and (25). It
can be seen that the extent of distortion in the level of
cost reduction efforts diminishes as the number of high-
severity patients rises. The third effect is the information
rent effect, which is shown in (17) and (29). The mag-
nitude of the information rent shrinks with an increase
(decrease) in the number of high-severity (low-severity)
patients.
To evaluate the impact on welfare of a change in Pmore
precisely, it is instructive to decompose welfare differ-
ences into three elements as above: the welfare difference
for (i) high-severity patients, (ii) low-severity patients in
the private hospital, and (iii) low-severity patients in the








+η[ θH − 2 η1 + η	θP]	θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Low-severity patients in the private hospital





Low-severity patients in the public hospital
.
(32)
1. For high-severity patients, only the distortion effect
influences welfare. As seen in (14) and (25), the
distortion effect is larger under the outlier payment
policy. As such, if P decreases (i.e., there are many
high-severity and few low-severity patients), the gap
in welfare under the two cases shrinks, and γ¯
increases (shown by the first term in (32)).
2. For low-severity patients in the private hospital, the
number effect and information rent effect are
influential. If there are many high-severity patients,
the number of patients for whom the insurer pays
information rent to the private hospital is small. This
effect moves γ¯ upward, since it increases social
welfare under the outlier payment policy; however,
this effect does not affect social welfare under the
patient dumping policy. In contrast, the information
rent effect moves γ¯ downward since it is milder
under the outlier payment policy. Hence, if the
number effect is weaker than the information rent
effect, a decrease in P moves γ¯ downward. When the
information rent per patient is smaller (i.e.,
θH − η1+ηP	θ is small), the number effect is weaker
(shown by the second term in (32)).
3. For low-severity patients in the public hospital, only
the information rent effect is applicable. As seen in
(17) and (29), this effect is weaker under the outlier
payment policy, which moves γ¯ downward.
The overall welfare impact of the patient dumping pol-
icy is determined by these tradeoffs. In particular, one
crucial factor yields the difference in efficiency of cost
reduction efforts between the two patient types. We sum-
marize this observation as follows.
Proposition 5 There exists θ¯H such that if θH > θ¯H,
∂γ¯
∂P ≥ 0, and if θH < θ¯H, ∂γ¯∂P ≤ 0.
This result asserts an important policy implication.
From Proposition 5, there exists a possibility of welfare
improvement by abolishing the outlier payment policy
even when the number of high-severity patients is large. If
the variance in efficiency of cost reduction efforts is large
(i.e., θH is small against 	θ ), the patient dumping pol-
icy is preferred over the outlier payment policy for more
diseases (i.e., γ¯ moves downward).
Figure 1 depicts the region in which ∂γ¯
∂P < 0 holds.
The region tends to shrink as healthcare payment cost
η increases. Intuitively, if the healthcare payment cost is
large, the optimal information rent is smaller, and the
number effect weakens.
Proposition 6 γ¯ rises as the healthcare payment cost η
increases when P is high.
Woolhandler and Himmelstein [33] and Woolhandler
and Himmelstein [34] empirically investigated per capita
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Fig. 1 Effect of P on γ¯
administrative cost for US and Canadian healthcare pay-
ment programs and found that it is higher in the United
States than in Canada. As such, our model implies that the
patient dumping policy is more advantageous in Canada.
Higher number of patients in the private hospital
We now examine how a change in the proportion of
patients who visit the private hospital, as captured by λ,







2	θ2 ≤ 0. (33)
Note that a change in λ does not affect social welfare
under the outlier payment policy since the optimal con-
tract is symmetric between the two hospitals and thus
independent of λ. This is not the case under the patient
dumping policy, however, as the optimal contract is asym-
metric. If the number of patients who select the private
hospital increases (i.e., λ increases), the distortion in the
cost reduction efforts decreases under the patient dump-
ing policy (25). This moves γ¯ upward, thereby favoring
the patient dumping policy over the outlier payment pol-
icy. However, as shown in (28), the optimal information
rent increases as λ increases, which yields a countervail-
ing effect and moves λ downward. We can show that this
latter effect is generally stronger than the former; hence,
an increase in λ always reduces γ¯ as shown in (33).
Proposition 7 γ¯ decreases as λ increases.
It is intuitively clear that patients’ initial choice of hospi-
tals, given exogenously in our model, could influence the
optimal healthcare payment scheme significantly. Accord-
ing to the proposition, under the assumption that patient
dumping is allowed only for private hospitals, social wel-
fare can be improved by abolishing the outlier payment
policy against many diseases in areas where more private
hospitals operate. In practice, this implies that a regula-
tory agency should admit selected regional variations in
the healthcare payment scheme as the number of private
institutions is expected to be high in urban areas and low
in rural areas.
Discussion and conclusions
The main result of this paper is that there are cases
in which insurers should not reimburse additional pay-
ments to hospitals that admit expensive patients even
though doing so may trigger socially expensive patient
dumping. A payment scheme that insures against outlier
patients exacerbates the extent of information asymmetry
between insurers and hospitals and consequently results
in less-efficient effort for cost reduction. When this cost is
sufficiently significant, insurers should instead allow hos-
pitals to dump expensive patients to specific hospitals as
a second-best alternative to the outlier payment policy.
We show that such a payment scheme, which tolerates a
degree of patient dumping, can ease information asymme-
try and improve efficiency under some conditions.
One important limitation of our model is the assump-
tion that patients are allocated randomly to hospitals.
However, as we have shown in Appendix A, relaxing this
assumption does not alter our main contention in any
qualitative way. The analysis would be more complete,
though certainly more complicated, if we more explicitly
modeled patients’ choice of hospitals taking technology
difference between hospitals or reputation into considera-
tion. In the future, it might be of interest to explore three-
way interactions among insurers, hospitals, and patients.
Endnotes
1 For instance, see Newhouse [26] for this classification.
2 Stephan and Berger [32] noted that a patient’s pathway
(preclinical medical plan) shortens her hospital stay and
reduces total treatment cost.
3 For instance, the United States adopted the prospec-
tive payment system in 1983. Some countries, notably
Japan, still adopt the retrospective payment system.
4This problem was discussed in Ma [21].
5 If insurers pay all of the treatment cost, hospitals take
no risk; such a healthcare payment system is equivalent to
the retrospective payment system.
6This assumption of asymmetric information is com-
mon in the literature. See Chalkley and Malcomson
(1998), Sappington and Lewis (1999), Glazer andMcGuire
[16], Beitia [3], Marchand et al. [22], Chalkley and Khalil
[5], Siciliani [30], and, Mougeot and Naegelen [24].
7Woolhandler and Himmelstein [33] and Woolhandler
and Himmelstein [34] compare the administrative cost of
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healthcare programs per capita between the United States
and Canada. Skinner et al. [31] investigates the deter-
minants of inefficiency in the Medicare program in the
United States.
8 The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act prohibits patient dumping in any region of the United
States, and the Centers forMedicare &Medicaid Services,
a division of the United States’ Department of Health
and Human Services, reimburse treatment cost under
the Medicare program (this can be considered an outlier
payment).
9 For instance, when insurers define the payment for
average-severity patients as the fixed payment under the
prospective payment system, the difference of payment
for high- and average-severity patients can be interpreted
as outlier payment.
10Numerous studies examine the optimality of outlier
payments: Ellis and McGuire [11], Selden [29], Newhouse
[26], Chalkley and Malcomson (1998), Ellis [10], Keeler
et al. [20], Glazer and McGuire [16], Glazer and McGuire
[17], Meltzer et al. [23], Barros [2], Eggleston [9], Jack [19].
11 See also Ellis and McGuire [13], Eggleston (2000),
Frank et al. [15], and Siciliani [30].
12 See also Marchand et al. [22].
13We assume that each patient does not know his or her
severity and chooses a hospital based solely on exogenous
factors such as proximity. Of course, we can obtain qual-
itatively similar results as long as exogenous factors have
some effect.
14 For example, the degree of preventive care by doctors
can be interpreted as such a variable.
15All propositions hold so long as the hospital’s payoff
function has the Spence–Mirrlees single crossing prop-
erty.
16 In Appendix B. we investigate that the patient dump-
ing policy can be optimal even it has the effect on the
treatment quality in the public hospital.
17Additional treatment cost includes the social cost
indicated by Newhouse [25].
18 For example, see Salanie [27].
19We so far assume that the private/public patient ratio
λ is unaffected by the insurer’s policy choice. In the
Appendix, we show that the following proposition is satis-
fied even when we patients choice hospital endogenously.
Appendix A: Endogenous hospital choice
In Section 5, we assume that the private/public patient
ratio λ is exogenously given and not affected by policy
change since the patients cannot recognize the severity
of their condition. However, if the insurer introduces the
patient dumping policy and the patients are aware of it, a
fraction of patients who select the private hospital under
the outlier payment policy may select the public hospital
ab initio to ensure that they are not dumped and do not
to bear the dumping cost even when they do not know the
severity of their condition.
Further, in the appendix, we build a Hotelling model
that describes the patients’ hospital choice. In this model,
patients choose a hospital while taking into account the
risk of dumping. Lastly, we show that Proposition 4 is
satisfied even in this case.
We consider a market where the patients are distributed
horizontally and uniformly on the line with length 1. Their
location is denoted by x where x ∈[ 0, 1]. The private hos-
pital is located on the left end of the line and the public
hospital on the right. The utility of a patient located at x
and treated at hospital i is given by
U(x) =
{
v − tx (i = pr)
v − t(1 − x) (i = pu)
where v is the benefit of treatment provided by the hos-
pitals under the outlier payment policy and t(> 0) is
the marginal transportation cost. Assume that v is large
enough and all patients on the line are treated at the hospi-
tal. There is no technology gap between the two hospitals,
and under the outlier payment policy the value of treat-
ment is the same between the hospitals. The location of
the patient who is indifferent between the two hospitals
under the outlier payment policy is
x¯ = 12 .
Then, we obtain that the fraction of patients who go to
the private hospital is λ¯ = 12 under the outlier payment
policy when we endogenize the patients’ hospital choice.
Next, we derive the fraction of patients under the patient
dumping policy. Under this policy, high-severity patients
who go to the private hospital are dumped to the public
hospital. Then, the expected utility of patients who go to
the private hospital is reduced to v′ where 0 < v′ < v.
Under the patient dumping policy, the location of the
patient who is indifferent between the two hospitals is
x˜ = 12 −
v − v′
2t .
Then, we obtain the fraction of patients who go to the




2t . Obviously, λ˜ < λ¯, and we find that the patient
dumping policy reduces the number of patients who go to
the private hospital.
Increasing the proportion of patients who select the
public hospital under the patient dumping policy has
three effects.20 The first is the self-selection effect. Under
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the outlier payment policy, the expected patient dumping
cost is φλγ . However, if the fraction of patients who select
the private hospital under the outlier payment policy
select the public hospital first, the expected patient dump-
ing policy is reduced to φλ˜γ . Then, the relative superiority
of the patient dumping policy becomes substantial. The
second is the optimal contract effect. As seen in (25), (26),
(28) and (29), the optimal contract for the public hospital
depends on λ. As previously demonstrated, in the opti-
mal contract, the cost reduction efforts for high-severity
patients and the information rent for low-severity patients
are higher under the patient dumping policy than under
the outlier payment policy. If λ changes to λ˜ under the
patient dumping policy, these effects weaken. The third is
the number effect. Under the patient dumping policy, the
optimal information rent for low-severity patients in the
private hospital is reduced to zero. Then, if λ changes to
λ˜, this information rent-saving effect weakens due to the
change in the number of patients, and the superiority of
the patient dumping policy diminishes.
Next, we aggregate these effects. We term the optimized
social welfare under the patient dumping policy when a
fraction of λ˜ select the private hospital as W˜D∗ . We com-
pute the welfare difference between the two policies as
follows:



























Low-severity patients in the public hospital
.
(34)
We denote the threshold γ as γ˜ between the two policies
when patient movement occurs. By rearranging (34), we
obtain

















The second and third terms are negative by assumption.
And we obtain that there exists a threshold patient dump-
ing cost γ˜ that satisfies γ˜ ∈ (−∞, 1) even when patient
movement occurs.
Appendix B: Congestion effect
In the analysis, we assume that the patients who are
treated immediately can obtain constant utility, which is
normalized to 1. However, it is conceivable that under the
patient dumping policy, a concentration of patients to the
public hospital occurs, and the treatment quality provided
by the public hospital changes. It will be worse off if the
patient concentration imposes a burden on the physicians
in the public hospital, where they cannot refuse the treat-
ment for the high-severity patients, considering skilled
physicians often shift to private hospitals. However, it will
be better if the increase in the number of patients under
the patient dumping policy trains the physicians’ skill in
the public hospital.
In this appendix, we investigate this congestion effect on
the welfare and optimal healthcare payment policy under
the patient dumping policy. Assume that the utility of a
patient treated in the public hospital under the patient
dumping policy is reduced by α. That is, the utility of
patients who are treated immediately is 1 − α, and the
utility of patients who are dumped by the private hospi-
tal is γ − α. If α > 0, the congestion effect improves the
treatment quality in the public hospital under the policy,
otherwise, α < 0. Obviously, when α > 0, the patient
dumping policy becomes advantageous.
Next, we show the condition under which the patient
dumping policy is preferred to the outlier payment policy.
We denote the optimized social welfare under the patient
dumping policy with the congestion effect as WˆD∗. The
welfare difference between the two policies is as follows.
WˆD∗ − WO∗ = 12φλ(1 + η)
(
η
1 + η P	θ
)2
(2 − λ) − φλ(1 − γ )
+ λ(1 − φ)η
(
θH − η1 + η P	θ
)
	θ
− (1 − λ)(1 − φ)ηλ η1 + η P	θ
2
− (1 − λ + λφ)α
(36)
The last term indicates the welfare loss due to the con-
gestion effect under the patient dumping policy. We term
the threshold γ as γˆ between the two policies, considering
the congestion effect and we obtain
γˆ = 1 − ηP	θ
(




+ (1 − λ + λφ)α
φλ
.








(1 − λ + λφ) > α
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If the inequality is satisfied, the patient dumping policy
is preferred even when there is the congestion effect under
the patient dumping policy. Considering the parameter
constraints, the left hand side is negative. Therefore, if the
congestion has negative effect on the treatment quality in
the public hospital under the patient dumping policy, then
the patient dumping policy can be optimal.
Acknowledgements
During the course of this study, I talked to many people whose knowledge
and ideas contributed significantly to the analysis in this paper. In particular, I
thank Junichiro Ishida, Shingo Ishiguro, and Noriaki Matsushima for their
comments and the helpful discussions I had with them. I also thank Akifumi
Ishihara, Hiroshi Kitamura, Akira Miyaoka, Keizo Mizuno, Ryo Ogawa, Wataru
Tamura, and participants at the Applied Microeconomic Theory Workshop, the
Japan Association for Applied Economics 2012 spring meeting, the Japanese
Economic Association 2012 spring meeting, the Contract Theory Workshop
Summer Camp 2012 in Shinshu, the Applied Economic Theory Workshop for
Alumni, the Workshop in Macroeconomics for Young Economists, the 13th
International Meeting of the Association for Public Economic Theory(PET13),
the Lunchtime Workshop at Kyoto University, and Kwansei Gakuin Industrial
Organization Workshop for their constructive comments.
Competing interests
The author declares that he/she has no competing interests.
Received: 22 July 2016 Accepted: 10 November 2016
References
1. Allen R, Gertler P. Regulation and the provision of quality to
heterogeneous consumers: The case of prospective pricing of medical
services. J Regul Econ. 1991;3(4):361–75.
2. Barros PP. Cream-skimming, incentives for efficiency and payment
system. J Health Econ. 2003;22(3):491–43.
3. Beitia A. Hospital quality choice and market structure in a regulated
duopoly. J Health Econ. 2003;22(6):1011–36.
4. Canta C. Efficiency, access, and the mixed delivery of health care services.
mimeo. 2012. https://chiaracanta.files.wordpress.com/2009/11/canta_
151020122.pdf.
5. Chalkley M, Khalil F. Third party purchasing of health services: Patient
choice and agency. J Health Econ. 2005;24(6):1132–53.
6. Chalkley M, Malcomson JM. Contracting for health services when patient
demand does not reflect quality. J Health Econ. 1998;17(1):1–19.
7. Dranove, D. Rate-setting by diagnosis related groups and hospital
specialization. RAND J Econ. 1987;18(3):417–27.
8. Eggleston, K. Risk selection and optimal health insurance-provider
payment systems. J Risk Insur. 2000;67(2):173–96.
9. Eggleston, K. Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment.
J Health Econ. 2005;24(1):211–23.
10. Ellis RP. Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the
intensive and extensive margins. J Health Econ. 1998;17(5):537–55.
11. Ellis RP, McGuire TG. Provider behavior under prospective:
reimbursement: Cost sharing and supply. J Health Econ. 1986;5(2):129–51.
12. Ellis RP, McGuire TG. Optimal payment system for health services.
J Health Econ. 1990;9(4):375–96.
13. Ellis RP, McGuire TG. Hospital response to prospective payment: Moral
hazard, selection, and practice style effects. J Health Econ. 1996;15(3):
257–77.
14. Eze P, Wolfe B. Is dumping socially inefficient? An analysis of the effect on
Medicare’s prospective payment system on the utilization of veterans
affairs inpatient services. J Public Econ. 1993;52(3):329–44.
15. Frank RG, Glazer J, McGuire TG. Measuring adverse selection in managed
health care. J Health Econ. 2000;19(6):829–54.
16. Glazer J, McGuire TG. Optimal risk adjustment in markets with adverse
selection: an application to managed care. Amer Econ Rev. 2000;90(4):
1055–71.
17. Glazer J, McGuire TG. Setting health plan premiums to ensure efficient
quality in health care: minimum variance optimal risk adjustment. J Public
Econ. 2002;84(2):153–73.
18. Jack, W. Purchasing health care services from providers with unknown
altruism. J Health Econ. 2005;24(1):73–93.
19. Jack, W. Optimal risk adjustment with adverse selection and spatial
competition. J Health Econ. 2006;25(5):908–26.
20. Keeler EB, Carter G, Newhouse JP. A model of the impact of
reimbursement schemes on health plan choice. J Health Econ. 1998;17(3):
297–320.
21. Ma CA. Health care payment system: cost and quality incentives. J Econ
Manage Strat. 1994;3(1):93–112.
22. Marchand M, Sato M, Schokkaert E. Prior health expenditures and risk
sharing with insures competition quality. RAND J Econ. 2003;34(4):647–69.
23. Meltzer D, Chung J, Basu A. Does competition under Medicare
prospective payment selectively reduce expenditures on high-cost
patients? RAND J Econ. 2002;33(3):447–68.
24. Mougeot M, Naegelen F. Supply-side risk adjustment and outlier
payment policy. J Health Econ. 2008;27(5):1196–200.
25. Newhouse JP. Two prospective difficulties with prospective payment of
hospitals, or, it’s better to be a resident than a patient with an complex
problem. J Health Econ. 1983;2(3):269–74.
26. Newhouse JP. Reimbursing health plans and health providers: Efficiency
in production versus selection. J Econ Lit. 1996;34(3):1236–63.
27. Salanie B. A economics of contracts: primer. Cambridge: The MIT Press;
2005.
28. Sappington DEM, Lewis TR. Using subjective risk adjusting to prevent
patient dumping in the health care industry. J Econ Manag Strat.
1999;8(3):351–82.
29. Selden TM. A model of capitation. J Health Econ. 1990;8(3):397–409.
30. Siciliani L. Selection of treatment under prospective payment system in
the hospital sector. J Health Econ. 2006;25(3):479–99.
31. Skinner JS, Elliott S, Fischer, Wennberg J. The efficiency of Medicare In:
Wise DA, editor. Analysis in the Economics of Aging, NBER Book Series -
The Economics of Aging. Chapter 6. Chicago: University of Chicago Press;
2005. p. 129–60.
32. Stephan AE, Berger DL. Shortened length of stay and hospital cost
reduction with implementation of an accelerated clinical care pathway
after elective colon resection. Surgery. 2003;133(3):277–83.
33. Woolhandler S, Himmelstein DU. The Deteriorating administrative
efficiency of the U.S. health care system. N Engl J Med. 1991;324(18):
1253–8.
34. Woolhandler S, Himmelstein DU. Costs of health care administration in
the United States and Canada. N Engl J Med. 2003;349(8):768–75.
Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
